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Tax Strategies Are Not
Patentable Inventions
BY ANDREW A. SCHWARTZ
In the most recent issue of this
Newsletter, E. Anthony Figg, the
immediate past Section Chair,
addressed certain policy concerns
relating to patents on "tax strate-
gies" and responded to the "quite
negative" reactions of tax and
estate-planning professionals "to
Andrew A. Schwartz the realization that tax preparation
and planning methods represent
patentable subject matter.:'
This "realization" dates back to 2003, when the Patent
Office awarded its first ever tax-strategy patent,2 thereby
tacitly expressing its view that tax strategies are eligible
for patenting. The Office has since stated its view that
tax strategies are a type of business method3 and are
therefore patentable under the authority of State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc.4
But the issue of whether tax strategies meet the statu-
tory requirements of the Patent Act has never been
resolved by any court,5 nor has it even been analyzed in
the academic literature. 6 At a recent hearing of the
Subcomittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House
Ways and Means Committee on "issues relating to the
patenting of tax advice," for example, none of the wit-
nesses (including the General Counsel of the USPTO
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue) questioned
the patentability of tax strategies. Their testimony
focused entirely on the policy implications of this new
type of patent and on whether Congress should amend
the Patent Act to exclude tax strategies from the scope of
patentable subject matter.
This article suggests, however, that tax strategies cannot
be patented, no matter how novel or nonobvious, because
they are not "inventions" within the meaning of Section
101 of the Patent Act of 1952, as amended to date.
I. The Invention Requirement
The Patent Act provides that a patent may issue for "any
new and useful process" or product.7 The Supreme Court
has held that this language to include within its scope
"anything under the sun made by man."8 But Congress
did not, by enacting the Patent Act, give the Patent
Office a blank check. To the contrary, Congress limited
its authority by including a number of conditions and
requirements for patentability, such as novelty, inventor-
ship and nonobviousness. 9 One of these conditions is
that only "inventions" may be patented.'
0
What is meant by the term "invention"? The defini-
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tion provided in Section 100 of the Patent Act - "The
term 'invention' means invention or discovery."' 1 - is
not helpful. A leading legal dictionary's entry for "inven-
tion" describes it as a "word impossible of definition.12
The Supreme Court, however, has not shied away from
this challenge and has offered a clear and workable defi-
nition of the term "invention" from as far back as the late
nineteenth century to as recently as the late twentieth
century. To understand the court's definition, however,
requires a detour into the "law-of-nature" doctrine.
II. The Law-of-Nature Doctrine and Its Corollary
As discussed above, "anything under the sun made by
man" is eligible for patenting. 3 It is well settled that the
converse is also true: anything that was not "made by
man" may not be patented. This is referred to herein as
the "law-of-nature doctrine."'
14
Thus, a product of nature, such as "a new mineral dis-
covered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild[,] is
not patentable subject matter."' The same can be said
for laws of nature (gravity, 6 e=mc 2), 17 natural phenome-
na 8 (volcanic eruptions, the tides), abstract scientific
principles 19 (thermodynamics, quantum physics) and
mathematical concepts and algorithms2" (the
Pythagorean theorem, 21 calculus, the Fourier series). All
of these are referred to collectively herein as "laws
of nature," and they are all excluded from patentable
subject matter under the law-of-nature doctrine.
22
The "underlying notion" of the law-of-nature doctrine is
that laws of nature have "always existed," just waiting to be
discovered by humankind. 3 Because laws of nature have
always existed, it logically follows that they cannot be
newly created by humans. Hence, they necessarily fail the
anything-under-the-sun-made-by-man 24 test and are
excluded from patentable subject matter for that reason.
Thus, the law-of-nature doctrine holds that laws of
nature are not patent-eligible. 25
But there is a vital corollary to the law-of-nature doc-
trine: while a law of nature may not itself be patented, an
application of that law of nature "may well be deserving
of patent protection."26 The Wright brothers' airplane was
able to fly because it exploited certain laws of physics that
are inherent in the universe. Whereas the underlying laws
of physics that kept the plane in the air were not
patentable, the airplane itself clearly would be. Similarly,
when presented with Samuel Morse's patent on the tele-
graph, 7 the Supreme Court upheld the first seven of his
claims, but rejected the last which claimed "the use of the
motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I
call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or
printing [characters] at any distances. ' 28
This distinction between laws of nature and the appli-
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cation thereof - however difficult to make in a given
case29 - is closely related to that which separates engi-
neers from scientists. Scientists use experiments to
understand and describe laws of nature.3" But engineers
create machines and methods for applying those laws of
nature for human benefit.31 As discussed in the next sec-
tion, the term "invention" refers to the work of engi-
neers, not scientists. 2
11. Definition of "Invention"
From at least as early as the Telephone Cases (1888)," to
as recently as Diamond v. Diehr (1981)," the Supreme
Court has construed the term "invention," for purposes of
patentability, in a single, consistent fashion: an "inven-
tion" is anything made by man that uses or harnesses one
or more "laws of nature" for human benefit.3 5 This con-
struction harmonizes well with the law-of-nature doc-
trine and its corollary.
A simple example of a patentable invention is the
watermill3 6 which is a system of extracting power from a
river and using it to run machinery. The river's power, of
course, comes from the natural force of gravity. Another
example is the I-beam, a construction beam with a cross
section that resembles an uppercase "I." The I-beam is
extremely strong, relative to its own weight, because it has
a high "moment of inertia," a natural phenomenon.
By way of contrast, a "perpetual motion" machine
does not harness any known laws of nature, but rather
violates them. A perpetual motion machine therefore
cannot qualify as an invention, and the Patent Office reg-
ularly rejects patents for such devices.37
The earliest description of a patentable invention by the
Supreme Court as something that employs laws of nature
for human benefit appears to be in a colorful concurring
opinion from the Morse telegraph case of 1 853. 38 In his
concurrence, Justice Grier described the difference between
scientists ("philosophers," as he calls them) and engineers:
The mere discovery of a new element or law or principle
of nature, without any valuable application of it to the
arts, is not the subject of a patent. But he who takes this
new element or power, as yet useless, from the laboratory
of the philosopher and makes it the servant of man; who
applies it to the perfecting of a new and useful art or to the
improvement of one already known, is the benefactor to
whom the patent law tenders its protection.
39
The first majority opinion taking this view came
decades later in the Telephone Cases (1888),4' a consoli-
dated action of numerous suits brought by Alexander
Graham Bell for infringement of his patent on the tele-
phone. In upholding his broad fifth claim,41 the Supreme
Court explained that it was valid because it disclosed a
method of harnessing a law of nature for human benefit:
What made the telephone a patentable invention, said the
court, was that "one of the forces of nature is employed
[E]lectricity, left to itself, will not do what is wanted.
The [invention] consists in controlling the force as to
make it accomplish the purpose."42
In the twentieth century, the court explained in United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. (1933)13 that "the act
of invention.. .consists neither in finding out the laws of
nature, nor in fruitful research as to the operation of nat-
ural laws,...but in discovering how those laws may be
used or applied for some beneficial purpose, by a
process, a device or a machine.""44 Similar language was
employed in the later cases of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co. (1948), 41 Gottschalk v. Benson
(1972),46 and Diamond v. Diehr (1981).1
7
In short, this clear and consistent body of Supreme
Court case law establishes that the term "invention," as
used in all Patent Acts to date, encompasses anything
made by man that uses or harnesses one or more "laws
of nature" for human benefit.
It bears noting, further, that this definition of inven-
tion has apparently also achieved universal acceptance
around the world. The few patent systems that define
invention by statute have adopted this construction. The
Japanese Patent Law, for example, defines invention as
"a highly advanced creation of a technical idea making
use of a law of nature."48 Similarly, the Patent Act of
the Republic of Korea states that "'invention' means the
highly advanced creation of a technical idea using the
rules of nature."4 9 Continental Europe appears
to endorse this view as well.5" It appears that no one,
ever, has questioned this understanding of the term
"invention."
IV. Tax Strategies Are Not Inventions
A novel tax strategy - whether it "works" under current
law or not - cannot be an invention. As explained
above, for an innovation to qualify as an invention, it
must be human-made and employ or harness a law of
nature. But tax strategies do not employ any law of
nature to reduce tax liability. Rather, they employ or
exploit one or more "laws of man" to achieve that result.
Consider for example the SOGRAT method, which is
claimed by the first tax-strategy patent issued by the
Patent Office. 51 This "estate planning method for mini-
mizing transfer tax liability" ostensibly minimizes trans-
fer tax through the use of a grantor-retained annuity trust
(GRAT) funded with stock options (SO). The patented
SOGRAT method appears to employ 26 U.S.C. § 2702
of the Internal Revenue Code in a novel manner to
reduce estate tax liability.
Assuming, arguendo, that the SOGRAT "works" as a
matter of federal tax law, it works because it uses (or
exploits) 26 U.S.C. § 2702 - a "law of man" - to ben-
efit at least some humans (heirs and devisees). It does
not have any interaction with the natural world and
clearly does not harness any law of nature. It is therefore
not a patentable invention under the definition estab-
lished by the Supreme Court and described above.
The same can be said of any method, strategy, struc-
ture or technique to reduce or eliminate tax liability. All
such tax strategies work - if they work - by harness-
ing statutes, regulations or common law, not any law of
nature or natural phenomena. Tax strategies thus fall out-
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side the scope of "inventions" patentable under the
Patent Act and cannot be patented.52
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